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VENUS HOMOTOPICALLY
ANDREI RODIN
Abstract. The identity concept developed in the Homotopy Type theory (HoTT) sup-
ports an analysis of Frege’s famous Venus example, which explains how empirical evi-
dences justify judgements about identities. In the context of this analysis we consider
the traditional distinction between the extension and the intension of concepts as it ap-
pears in HoTT, discuss an ontological significance of this distinction and, finally, provide
a homotopical reconstruction of a basic kinematic scheme, which is used in the Classical
Mechanics, and discuss its relevance in the Quantum Mechanics.
1. Introduction
According to Frege
Identity is a relation given to us in such a specific form that it is inconceiv-
able that various kinds of it should occur [6] (p. 254) 1
In the second half of the 20th century this view was challenged by Peter Geach [10] who
developed a theory of what he called the relative identity. Contrary to Frege, Geach holds
that the identity concept allows for specifications, which depend on certain associated
sortals 2.
Key words and phrases. identity, homotopy type theory, intension, kinematics.
1“Die Identitaet ist eine so bestimmt gegebene Beziehung, dass nicht abzusehen ist, wie bei ihr ver-
schiedene Arten vorkommen ko¨nnen.”
2Let a, b be parallel lines on Euclidean plane, in symbols a//b. Given that // is an equivalence relation,
Frege suggests to “take this relation as identity” (in symbols a = b) and thus obtain a new abstract object
called direction ([7], p. 74e; for a more detailed reconstruction of Frege’s abstraction see [23]). Geach’s
analysis of the same example is different: according to Geach a = b reads “a and b are the same as direction”
even if a and b are different as lines.
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Geach’s unorthodox view on identity has been never developed into an independent formal
logical system and remain today rather marginal [2]. However the idea that, contrary to
Frege’s view, the identity concept can and should be diversified more recently reappeared
in a different form in Martin-Lo¨f’s Constructive Type theory (MLTT) [14] and in the yet
more recent geometrical interpretation of MLTT called Homotopy Type theory (HoTT)
[16]. Unlike Geach’s original proposal, which has hardly had any influence outside the
philosophical logic, HoTT is a piece of new interesting mathematics and mathematical
logic closely relevant to Computer Sciences.
The aim of this paper is to analyze some of Frege’s ideas about identity in terms of the
identity concept as it appears in MLTT and HoTT. In this way I hope to make the tech-
nical MLTT-HoTT identity concept more philosophically meaningful and more open to its
possible applications in science.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section I present Frege’s Venus
example and overview its analysis by the author. In the following three Sections I introduce
a basic fragment of MLTT and HoTT and discuss the difference between extensional and
intensional versions of these theories. Then I present a reconstruction of Frege’s Venus
with HoTT and discuss in this context an ontological impact of the distinction between
extensions and intensions. Finally, I extend my reconstruction of Venus to what I call
the Basic Kinematic Scheme used in the Classical Mechanics and briefly discuss a possible
relevance of this homotopical reconstruction in the Quantum Mechanics.
2. How identity statements are known?
Some identity statements are trivial and non-informative while some other are highly in-
formative and in some cases very hard to prove. For example “2 = 2” (in words “two is
two”) is trivial, “2 is the only even prime number” is somewhat more informative but easy
(since it follows immediately from the definitions of “even” and “prime”), while “2 is the
biggest power n such that the equation xn + yn = zn has a solution in natural numbers”
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is both informative and highly non-trivial (it is a famous theorem conjectured by Pie`rre
Fermat in 1637 and proved by Andrew Wiles in 1994).
A non-mathematical example of the same kind is given by Frege in his classical On Sense
and Reference [4] (English translation [5]). Frege considers three different names - Venus,
Morning Star and Evening Star - which all refer to the same planet. Frege wonders how
it is possible that while the identity statements
(1) Venus is Venus and
(2) Venus is Morning Star
are trivial (assuming that the latter statement expresses nothing but a linguistic conven-
tion) the statement
(3) Evening Star is Morning Star
is a non-obvious astronomical fact that needs an accurate justification, which involves both
a specific theoretical background and suitable observational data 3.
Where does the difference between informative and non-informative identity statements
come from? Frege does not provide a full answer to this question but does provide a
theoretical framework for answering it. For this end he distinguishes between the sense
and the reference of any given linguistic expression 4 . An identity statement of the form
a = b says that (and is tantamount of saying that) a and b have the same reference. The
references of terms “a” and“b” fully determine the reference of expression “a = b”, which
according to Frege is the truth-value of the corresponding proposition. But on the top of
that each of expressions “a”, “b”, and “a = b” has a certain sense. The sense of expression
3Instead of talking about trivial and non-trivial statements Frege uses here the Kantian distinction
between synthetic and analytic judgements and also talk about the “cognitive value” of the corresponding
thoughts. I shall not use Frege’s original way of expressing these ideas in my presentation.
4Some writers who want to stress the originality of Frege’s logical ideas leave Frege’s German terms for
sense and reference (Sinn und Bedeutung) without translation even if they write in English. I use standard
English translations instead.
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“a = b” is determined by the sense of “a”, the sense of “b”, and the way in which these
two terms are combined. 5.
Whether an identity statement is informative or not depends on its sense (and hence on
the sense of its constituents) but not on its reference. Thus there is no mystery in the fact
that statements of the form a = a are always trivial (assuming that both the sense of the
reference of “a” is fixed), while statements of the form a = b can be either trivial (when
terms a, b have the same sense) or non-trivial (when terms a, b have different senses). In
expressions (1) and (2) both terms have the same meaning (even if in (2) these terms differ
linguistically) but in (3) the senses of two terms are different. This is why (1) and (2) are
trivial but (3) is not.
Obviously this is not a complete explanation. Frege’s system of symbolic logic aka Begriff-
sschrift [3] does not full justice to his own distinction between the sense and the reference
of a linguistic expression [13]. It does not provide any specific logical rule for operating
with senses of propositions. So Frege points to a problem but leaves it largely open. More
recently a number of so-called intensional logical systems have been developed, some of
them are motivated by the idea of formalizing certain aspects of Frege’s sense. The distinc-
tion between extensions and intensions of linguistic expressions and logical terms is closely
related to Frege’s distinction between sense and reference [1]. It has a long history in logic
and its philosophy and turns out to be instrumental in MLTT-HoTT, as we shall now see.
In the next section I explain the technical meaning of this distinction in MLTT and then
discuss its philosophical underpinning.
5This last thesis follows from a more general principle known as the compositionality of meaning. Frege
is sometimes credited for the alleged invention of this principle but the true history is more complicated
[15]
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3. Extension and Intension
MLTT [14] comprises two different forms of identity concept 6. These two forms of identity
should look familiar to anyone who has at least a rudimentary experience in programming.
It’s one thing to assign to a certain symbol or symbolic expression its semantic value (which
can be a number, a character, a string of characters and many other things) and it is quite
a different thing to state that certain things are equal. (Hereafter I use words “equal”
and “identical” interchangeably.) Only in the latter case one forms a proposition, which
typically has precisely one of the two Boolean values: True and False. Outside the context
of programming a similar distinction can be made between the naming or making some
more elaborated linguistic convention, on the one hand, and making a judgement to the
effect that certain things are equal, on the other hand. It’s one thing to adopt and apply
the convention according to which the goddess’ name Venus is an alias for what is also
known as the Morning Star, and it is, of course, quite a different thing to judge and state
that two apparently different celestial objects such as the Morning Star and the Evening
Star are, in fact, one and the same. In the latter case it is appropriate to ask for a proof.
But such a demand would be obviously pointless in the former case.
The first kind of identity (one related to conventions) Martin-Lo¨f calls definitional or
judgmental ; the second kind of identity he calls propositional. Following [16] I shall use
sign “≡” for the definitional identity and the usual sign “=” for the propositional identity.
Further, we should take typing into account. In MLTT both kinds of identity apply only
to terms of the same type 7 Typing is reflected in the notation as follows:
x, y : A is a judgment that states that terms x, y are of type A
Formula
6The original version of this theory involves four different kinds of identity ([14], page 59). I simplify
the original account by deliberately confusing some syntactic and semantical aspects. Then we are left with
the two forms of identity described below in the main text.
7I leave now aside how identity is applied in MLTT to types on the formal level. It is sufficient for my
present purpose to talk about the “same type” and “different types” in MLTT informally.
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(1) x ≡A y
stands for a judgement, which is tantamount to a convention (aka definition) according to
which terms x, y of the same type A have the same meaning. Given (1) one says that x, y
are definitionally equal.
The expression
(2) x =A y
, in its turn, stands for a proposition saying that terms x, y of type A are equal. (2) is
not a judgment but a new type. Under the intended proof-theoretic semantic of MLTT
any term p of this type is thought of as a proof of the corresponding proposition; in the
proof-theoretic jargon proofs are also called witnesses and sometimes evidences. So the
following judgement
(3) (2) p : x =A y
states that terms x, y are (propositionally) equal as this is evidenced by proof p.
Let us now see what kind of thing such a proof p can possibly be. In MLTT definitionally
equal terms are interchangeable salva veritate as usual. Under the intended semantic of
this theory this means that definitionally equal terms are interchangeable as proofs. This
property of ≡ and the reflexivity of = justify the following rule
x ≡A y
p : x =A y
where p ≡ reflx is built canonically ([16], p. 46). In words: the definitional identity
(equality) implies the propositional identity (equality).
VENUS HOMOTOPICALLY 7
The converse rule is called the equality reflection rule or ER for short:
p : x =A y
x ≡A y
In words: the propositional identity implies the definitional identity.
ER does not follow from other principles of MLTT but may be assumed as an indepen-
dent principle. In this case one obtains a version of MLTT, which is called (definitionally)
extensional. MLTT without ER is called intensional. It can be shown that in the exten-
sional MLTT any (propositional) identity type x =A y is either empty or has a single term,
namely reflx, which is the canonical proof of this identity “by definition”.
We see that ER makes the distinction between the definitional and the propositional iden-
tity purely formal and epistemologically insignificant. This feature of extensional MLTT
can be viewed as a desirable conceptual simplification but it comes with a price. A sig-
nificant part of this price concerns computational properties in MLTT and is important
for applications of this theory in programming: while the intensional MLTT is decidable
but the extensional MLTT is not. I shall not discuss this technical feature in this paper.
Instead I shall argue that the intensional MLTT has also important epistemic advantages
over its extensional cousin.
4. Fixing Identities or Leaving Them Evolving?
As we have seen in the extensional MLTT every identity is grounded in a definition. In order
to apply this formal theory in reasoning one needs to fix in advance via definitions exact
identity conditions for all objects involved in a given reasoning. This logical and epistemic
requirement is known in the form of slogan “no entity without identity” due to Quine. It is
interesting to notice that Quine himself does not accept this slogan without reservations.
In Quine’s view the slogan applies only in scientific reasoning and, moreover, only in the
contemporary form of scientific reasoning. Bulk terms (aka mass terms) like “water”,
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according to Quine, are remnants of an archaic logical scheme, which does not involve
the individuation in its today’s form. Quine further speculates that the contemporary
“individuative, object-oriented conceptual scheme” can be replaced in a future by a different
scheme, that will provide a “yet unimagined pattern beyond individuation” ([17], p. 24)
8. In what follows I argue that the intensional MLTT along with HoTT provides such
a pattern “beyond individuation” or at least a pattern of individuation beyond its usual
extensional mode. But beforehand I would like to stress once again that the standard
extensional mode of individuation is not sufficient for certain well-recognized and important
scientific purposes. Frege’s Venus example, if one takes it seriously, demonstrates this
clearly. Fixing the identity of Morning Star and Evening Star and Venus via a definition
is a prerequisite for applying a standard extensional logical scheme in any reasoning about
this celestial object. This condition makes it impossible to support with such a scheme a
reasoning, in which the identity of the Morning Star and the Evening Star is established
on the basis of certain sufficient evidences.
Frege’s example shows that “half-entites inaccessible to identity” ([17], p. 23) may look
more familiar than Quine’s colorful language suggests. In the Venus case we deal with a
relatively innocent violation of “no entity without identity” requirement. We start with
certain well-defined objects such as the Morning Star and the Evening Star but do not
exclude the possibility that these objects can be eventually proved to be the same even
if this fact does not follow from their definitions. Following Quine one may speculate
about further deviations from the standard extensional scheme and attempt to conceive
of a scheme, which does not use the definitional form identity at all. I shall not pursue
8Here is the full quote:
“[W]e may have in the bulk term a relic, half vestigial and half adapted, of a pre-individuative phase
in the evolution of our conceptual scheme. And some day, correspondingly, something of our present
individuative talk may in turn end up, half vestigial and half adapted, within a new and as yet unimagined
pattern beyond individuation. Transition to some such radically new pattern could occur either through a
conscious philosophical enterprise or by slow and unreasoned development along lines of least resistance. A
combination of both factors is likeliest [. . . ] ” ([17], p. 24)
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this further project in this paper. Instead I shall show how the innocent-looking modifi-
cation of the extensional scheme, which has been just explained, results into a remarkable
diversification of the standard identity concept.
5. Higher Identity Types
Recall that the intensional version of MLTT has been introduced above via a negative
characteristic: it is simply the MLTT without the reflexion rule ER.
The absence of ER allows for constructing further identity types as follows. Suppose we
have a propositional identity type and a pair of terms of this type:
x′, y′ : x =A y
Terms x′, y′ witness here the identity of terms x, y. It may happen that these two witnesses
are in fact the same and that this fact is witnessed by two further terms x′′, y′′:
x′′, y′′ : x′ =x=Ay y
′
This tower of higher identity types can be continued indefinitely. In the general case such
a structure may have, of course, more than just two elements on each level.
Until the late 1990-ies the mathematical structure of this formal syntactic construction
remained opaque. Since the intentionality in MLTT is a mere lack of the extensionality any
model of the extensional MLTT also qualifies as a model of the intensional version of this
theory. In 1994-1998 Hofmann and Streicher [11], [12] published the first non-extensional
model of MLTT where the first-level identity types were modeled by abstract groupoids.
This model allows the first-level identity types (i.e., types of the form x =A y where A is
a type other than identity) to have multiple non-trivial terms (proves) but does not allow
the same for all higher identity types. In other words, this model verifies the condition
called “extensionality one dimension up”. A deeper insight into the structure of higher
identity types has been obtained around 2006 when Awodey and Voevodsky independently
observed that the abstract groupoids of Hofman and Streicher’s model can be thought of as
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fundamental groupoids (i.e., groupoids of all continuous paths) of topological spaces and be
further extended to homotopy- and higher-homotopy groupoids of the same spaces, which
model higher-order identity types of MLTT. Thus the Homotopy theory allows for building
models of MLTT, which are “intensional all the way up”. In such models the identity types
of all levels are modeled uniformly. This discovery marked the emergence of a new theory
known today under the name of Homotopy type theory and of a closely related foundational
project called the Univalent Foundations of mathematics. For a systematic exposition of
HoTT I refer the reader to [16] 9
Beware that unlike Russell’s type theories and their likes HoTT does not form its hierarchy
of types by considering, first, classes of individuals, second, classes of such classes, and so
on. The hierarchy of types in HoTT is of a geometric or, more precisely, homotopic nature.
Sets are taken to be types of zero level. Terms of 0-types are points having non-trivial
paths between them. Terms of 1-types are points allowing for non-trivial paths between
them, but not allowing for non-trivial homotopies between these paths. Terms of 3-types
allow for paths and non-trivial homotopies but not for non-trivial higher homotopies. And
so on. 10. A given n-type can be transformed into its underlying m-type with m < n by
forgetting (or, more precisely, by trivializing) its higher-order structure of all levels > m.
Such an operation is called in HoTT truncation.
The logical significance and the possible epistemic function of higher identity types in
MLTT are not yet well understood. The present work is an attempt of filling a part of
this gap. In what follows consider only 0- and 1-types and leave a study of higher identity
types for a future work.
9Since this area of research is rapidly developing, the 2013 book [16] does not include certain new results
and developments. However it provides an systematic introduction, which is more than sufficient for my
present purpose.
10Here I follow [16], see p. 99-100. On an alternative count the 0-type is a single point, 1-types are
propositional types while sets are 2-types. The count adopted in [16] is more natural from a logical point
view (given the current usual understanding of logic) while the latter count used by Voevodsky in his
lectures is more natural from a geometric point of view.
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6. Is Frege’s Venus Example Linguistic?
Apparently Frege treats his Venus example as purely linguistic on equal footing with his
other examples, which involve Alexander the Great, Columbus, Napoleon, Kepler dying
in misery, Bucephalus and what not. Accordingly, the main result of his classical paper
[4], [5], namely the distinction between the sense and the reference of a given linguistic
expression, belongs primarily to the philosophy of language. Frege scholarship mostly
follows Frege in this respect: a linguistic leaning aka linguistic turnbecame a brand mark
of the influential Analytic branch of the 20th century and today’s philosophy. It is quite
remarkable, however, that when Frege first introduces and explains the Venus problem he
does this not only in linguistic terms:
The discovery that the rising Sun is not new every morning, but always the
same, was one of the most fertile astronomical discoveries. Even today the
identification of a small planet [i.e., an asteroid - A.R.] or a comet is not
always a matter of course. ([5], p. 56)
The idea that a logical analysis of ordinary language can be helpful for solving problems of
object identification in science in general and in astronomy in particular is based on Frege’s
strong assumption according to which the identity concept is the same in all these cases, so
that “it is inconceivable that various kinds of it should occur” (see the full quote and the
reference in the above Introduction). Without trying to challenge now this approach on the
methodological level I shall provide here an alternative analysis of the same example, which
takes its physical content and, even more importantly, its related mathematical form more
seriously and applies some basic elements of HoTT introduced in the previous Section.
As a matter of course this reconstruction is not intended to be a piece of mathematical
physics. Nevertheless it provides a novel formal approach to traditional metaphysical issues
concerning the identity through time and motion, which may be possibly helpful for dealing
with identity-related problems of modern physics [8], [9].
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Figure 1. Morning Star and Evening Star are the same!
Frege’s remark about the rising Sun quoted above applies both to the Morning Star (MS for
short) and to the Evening Star (ES). These two putative objects are posited as invariants
of certain sets of observations made in different places at different times by different people
with different astronomical instruments and with the naked eye. However for the sake
of the example I leave now this complex underlying structure aside and boldly assume
that MS and ES are provided with appropriate definitions, which allow all observers to
identify these objects unambiguously. How a proof of identity MS = ES may look like in
a proper realistic context? Classical Celestial Mechanics (CM), or more precisely a very
basic fragment of CM that I shall call Basic Kinematic Scheme (BKS) and discuss in more
detail in Section 8, provides a definite answer to this question. In order to prove that
MS = ES it is necessary and sufficient to present a continuous path aka trajectory p,
which connects MS and ES and thereby shows that these “two” objects are in fact one
and the same. The wanted trajectory p is itself a typical physical object: it is obviously
theoretically-laden, it has a canonical mathematical representation, and it is accessible
for observations which allow for empirical checks of its theoretically predicted properties.
Providing such a proof p amounts to a combination of theoretical work and observation,
which is typical in astronomy and any other mature science.
Since p has empirical contents and doesn’t go through without such contents it can not be
called formal. However the form of this proof is expressed within HoTT straightforwardly.
As we shall briefly see, this form qualifies both as logical and geometrical. The fact that in
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HoTT logical and geometrical forms go together, makes HoTT quite unlike other popular
formal systems such as the Classical First-Order Logic (FOL), see my [18], ch. 7, 10 for a
further discussion on this general issue. Remarkably, the geometrical form of p provided
by HoTT (namely, a path) and the standard geometrical representation of the same object
provided by CM and BKS (namely, a continuous curve) are nearly the same 11.
First, we need to specify a type (which under the homotopical interpretation is thought
of as a space) where MS and ES belong. Since MS,ES and other celestial bodies are
conceived in CM as point-like objects I call the corresponding type/space Pt and think of
it as a collection of points:
MS,ES : Pt
Then we form a new type/space MS =Pt ES, which is a space of continuous paths between
MS and ES. Finally, we specify a particular path p in this space:
p : MS =Pt ES
However little of HoTT’s resources we use here, this reconstruction of Frege’s example
provides some useful lessons as we shall now see.
11In Homotopy theory a path is not simply a curve but a parameterized curve. More formally path p
with endpoints A,B is a continuous map [0, 1] → S from unit interval to space S where A,B live, such
that p(0) = A and p(1) = B. While in the standard CM time features as a universal or “absolute”
external parameter, in Homotopy theory the corresponding parameter is used internally for each particular
path as just explained. Compare the notion of proper time along a worldline in General Relativity. The
difference between these two ways of thinking about time is quite substantial but it plays no role in my
analysis of Venus. The idea of identification of moving objects via continuous trajectories belongs to BKS
and by itself does not involve the notion of external universal time. This latter notion is specific for
CM, and its analysis is out of the scope of this paper. Historically BKS can be safely attributed to all
pre-relativistic astronomy including ancient astronomical theories, which don’t involve anything like the
Newtonian concepts of absolute space and time.
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7. Are Intensions Real?
Recall Frege’s question: What is the difference between the sense of proposition (1) MS =
MS and the sense of proposition (2) MS = ES? It appears to be in accord with Frege
to assume that senses of propositions depend functionally on their corresponding proofs
(even if proofs and senses are not exactly the same). Then our reconstruction of Venus
allows for a precise mathematical answer to Frege’s question: while the (unique) proof of
(1) is trivial loop reflMS , the proof of (2) is a non-trivial path p. In both cases a given
proposition has a single proof. However these two proofs essentially differ not only in their
intuitive “sense” but also in their geometric representation.
Let us now turn to some ontological issues. Albeit the concept of proof is epistemic par
excellence, the HoTT-based reconstruction of Venus makes it clear that proofs in the
standard proof-theoretic semantic of MLTT should not be necessary thought of as purely
mental constructions. Thinking about such proofs as truthmakers opens a way to various
forms of truthmaker realism [22]. Whether or not one takes Venus and/or its trajectory p
to be real entities depends, of course, on a particular ontology that one may associate with
CS or another theory supporting the relevant astronomical observations. In particular, CS
allows for a 4-dimensional ontology where atomic entities are points of Classical aka Neo-
Newtonian space-time (Sklar:1974, p. 202 ff). In this ontological framework p, seen as a
world-line, qualifies as a full-fledged entity while the moving object Venus is its momentary
slice. I shall not discuss here details of this and rival ontologies but rely on the fact that p
of our example allows for natural realistic interpretations.
According to Frege, senses should not be thought of as psychological entities belonging to
individual minds ([5], p. 38-39). However he suggests that senses wholly belong to human
collective memories stored in existing natural languages. The only way in which a given
sense can be possibly related to the non-human parts of our world, according to Frege’s
account as I understand it, is via the reference (if any) of the corresponding linguistic
expression. For example English word “apple” has a sense, which belongs to this language
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(and arguably is shared by other natural languages) and a reference, which is a real thing
that may exist independently of any linguistic and other human activities. English word
“unicorn” equally has a sense but has no reference; so this particular sense is detached
from any non-human reality.
The above is a rough interpretation of Frege’s view but it points to a common idea about
linguistic meaning, which is worth being considered here. Since Frege’s concept of sense
and the logical concept of intenision are closely related (see the end of Section 2 above), the
standard examples of so-called intensional contexts apparently provide a further linguistic
support to this idea. Such examples always have to do with intentions, beliefs, knowledge
and other human-related issues. So these examples square well with Frege’s view according
to which propositions MS = MS and MS = ME have “different cognitive values” because
their senses are different - in spite of the fact that their reference (truth-value) is the
same.
Our analysis of Venus suggests a revision of this view. Since proofs are constituents
of senses (of propositions), and since these proofs admit realistic interpretations, such
realistic interpretations may extend to senses. What I have in mind is not a justification
of some form of Meinongian existence of unicorns but rather the view that the distinction
between the sense and the reference of a given linguistic expression must be freed from
all ontological commitments altogether. The idea that the reference is the only linguistic
anchor that links human languages and the human cognition to non-human realities is
hardly justified. Sense and reference and their logical counterparts such as intensions and
extensions of concepts all make part of (various versions of) our conceptual apparatus. How
this apparatus connects us, humans, to non-human realities is a question, which cannot be
answered only by means of logical and conceptual analysis.
I submit that behind the view on meaning, which I purport now to criticize, is the following
strong ontological assumption:
(OE) All real entities are individuals.
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For further references I shall call this assumption the ontic extensionality or OE for short.
The reason why I call this assumption extensionality becomes clear from a homotopical re-
construction of Frege’s distinction between sense and reference, which generalizes upon the
above reconstruction of Venus as follows. References are point-like individuals belonging
to classes of alike individuals, which constitute extensions of their corresponding concepts.
Senses are higher-order homotopical structures, which involve spaces of paths and their
homotopies (including higher-order homotopies), and constitute intensions of the same
concepts. As we have already seen, in the extensional version of HoTT the higher-order
part of the structure is truncated. Hence the name for OE, which allows the truncated
higher-order part of the structure to have an epistemic and cognitive value but includes in
the ontology only its basic 0-level part.
From this point view it appears reasonable to claim that talks of apples, of unicorns, of
Bucephalus and of Alexander the Great have the same logical form, so the words “apple”
and “unicorn” both have a sense and a reference. By the reference of “unicorn” I understand
here a fictional individual. Propositions about apples and unicorns may well allow for the
same forms of truth-evaluation. The difference between merely fictional, legendary and
real entities concerns material (contentful) rather than formal features of truth-evaluation.
There is no way to distinguish between a fiction, a legend, and a historical fact on purely
formal grounds 12.
I can see no a priori reason for assuming that a part of the homotopic structure is more apt
to represent reality than any other. For that reason I don’t take OE for granted. Moreover
that our reconstruction of Venus suggests that terms of 1-types (paths) allow for a realistic
12The Bucephalus example demonstrates this particularly clearly. Bucephalus is a legendary horse
belonging to Alexander the Great. According to the legend Bucephalus was born the same day as Alexander
and, according to a particular version of the same legend, he also died the same day as Alexander. I don’t
know about a verdict of today’s historical science as to how much of this story (if any) is a historical fact
and how much of it is a fiction. I don’t believe that any advance in formal logic may help for answering
this question.
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interpretation as well as terms of 0-types (points). However in the next Section we shall
see that the situation is not so simple, and that BKS is compatible with OE after all.
Concluding this Section I would like to remark that OE goes along the view according to
which the Classical first-order logic (FOL) should be seen and used as the basic logical tool
for scientific reasoning. In this context the suggestion to drop OE and allow for higher-
order entities sounds a part of an argument in favor of a higher-order system of logic with a
standard class-based semantics. MLTT and HoTT indeed qualify as higher-order systems
in a relevant sense but the homotopical semantic used in HoTT is not standard. In HoTT
higher types are formed not by the reiteration of the powerset construction (i.e. not by
considering classes of classes of . . . of individuals) but in the geometric way, which has been
briefly explained in Section 5 above. Our homotopical reconstruction of Venus given in
Section 6 demonstrates how the geometric semantic of HoTT helps one to use this theory
as a tool for mathematical modeling in science, not only as a tool for a logical analysis of
science. I believe that this dummy example points to interesting theoretical possibilities
in mathematical physics. For serious attempts to use HoTT and its logical structure in
physics see [20], [19].
8. Basic Kinematic Scheme
Here I supplement the homotopical reconstruction of Venus from Section 6 with a similar
reconstruction of the Basic Kinematic Scheme (BKS), which captures the usual idea of
moving particle. The kinematic space K, in which MS and ES live, allows for multiple
paths (trajectories) sharing their ending points. I think about K not as a vehicle of
moving particles but rather as a collection Pt of such particles provided with an additional
structure, which represents their motions. The motions are represented by paths between
the particles as in the Venus example. The additional structure is that of groupoid of paths
over Pt. I do not include into K homotopies of paths beyond the trivial ones because such
things play no role in BKS. Paths in K are assumed to be reversible and composable by
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concatenation; the composition is associative 13. So in terms of HoTT K can be described
as a 1-type. Pt is its underlying 0-type obtained from K via (0-)truncation.
Let me now briefly repeat our homotopical reconstruction of Venus in this slightly extended
context. We take two points MS,ES in Pt and hence in K, and consider path space
MS =Pt ES, which is a subspace of K. Then we find in MS =Pt ES a particular path
p, which serves us as a proof of identity MS = ES. The extended context allows us now
to notice a fundamental feature of BKS, which so far remained out of the scope of our
analysis. It concerns the distinction between possible and actual paths. All terms of path
space MS =Pt ES can be described as possible paths, while the observed path p is the
unique one, which also qualifies as actual. The distinction between possible and actual
paths is essential for BKS because it is unthinkable - or more precisely unthinkable within
BKS - that the same particles follows two different paths simultaneously. Groupoid K by
itself does not reflect this feature, so we need an additional effort for taking it into account
14.
13In the usual Homotopy theory the composition of paths in a given space S is defined only up to
homotopy; in order to define such an operation one is obliged to provide an appropriate homotopy aka
reparameterization by hand. Since in HoTT homotopy types are primitive objects this issue is treated a
bit differently in this case. I shall only explain how it works in our reconstruction of BKS. We begin with
an abstract groupoid K without assuming any ambient space S in advance, and then see how much of BKS
we can recover in this way. This allows us to call the composition of paths in K concatenation without
talking of homotopies
14In order to make this feature more evident in Frege’s setting let us assume that MS and ES are ob-
served during a single 24-hours period of time and that definitions of these objects are designed accordingly.
Suppose one detects p, which is the trajectory of Venus during the time span between the morning and the
evening of that day. On this basis one concludes that MS is nothing but Venus observed in the morning
and ES is nothing but the same planet observed in the evening. It is unthinkable in such a situation that
there could exist a different trajectory p′ 6= p followed by the same moving object during the same period
of time.
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Let us see how certain possible paths in K are transformed into actual paths. I assume
that actual paths are closed under composition and thus form a subgroupoid A ⊂ K. The
structure of A can be fully reconstructed on the basis of only two plausible principles:
(1) (the uniqueness of actual path)
A is thin, that is, has at most one path between any two given points.
This principle excludes non-trivial loops (since every point already has a trivial loop, which
is its reflection) and all cycles (since all triangles commute). So A is a preorder.
(2) (equivalence)
A admits no branching.
Branching is excluded because it would represent “splitting identities” like in the popular
Ship of Theseus example. Such anomalies can considered elsewhere but not in BKS, which
takes it for granted that particles remain intact during their motions. More formally
(2) says that the identity relation represented in A by a set of paths, is an equivalence.
Together the two principles imply that A is a preorder of a trivial spaghetti-like sort. Each
particular noodle of A can be called a worldline of its corresponding particle (point). Since
such a noodle is contractible into a point, A and Pt are homotopically equivalent, i.e.,
represent the same 0-level homotopy type A ' Pt. The operation that takes space K
of possible trajectories into space A of actualtrajectories of the same points can be now
formally described as 0-truncation.
It is remarkable that we obtain here the familiar picture of 4D spatiotemporal “worms”
or “noodles” on purely formal grounds without referring to complicated issues concerning
space, time and spacetime 15. We have used for this only a tiny fragment of HoTT, which
15Since we are talking about the Classical Mechanics but not about the Relativistic Mechanics, the rele-
vant notion of spacetime is that of the Neo-Newtonian spacetime, see [21], p. 202 ff. Such an anachronistic
notion of spacetime shares a number of its basic constituents with its Relativistic successor. It goes without
saying that the difference between the two spacetime concepts is essential. However in the present analysis
I focus on what they share in common.
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Figure 2. Quantum Paths
can be easily translated into a programming code, and two additional principles, both of
which have formal character and can be also straightforwardly expressed in HoTT. At the
same time I would like to stress that the geometric intuitions associated with HoTT greatly
helped us to apply this formal tool in our analysis.
The above analysis of the BKS appears to be an appropriate starting point for building
a Quantum counterpart of this conceptual scheme. From the homotopical point of view
taken here there is nothing impossible or unnatural in the idea that a given particle may
follow multiple trajectories simultaneously as this is assumed in the Feynman path integral
formulation of Quantum Mechanics:
One may rather wonder why BKS requires truncation of K into A. What is behind the
traditional notion according to which the actual trajectory of a given particle during its
lifetime is necessary unique?
In order to provide a tentative answer let me return to the issue discussed in the last
Section. The above analysis of BKS apparently provides an additional evidence in favor
of OE (notice extensionality). The intensional groupoid structure of K represents possible
trajectories of particles. But since in the real world each particle has a unique worldline
the groupoid K is reduced (truncated) to the extensional set A ' Pt. Conversely, one
may argue that OE in the given setting implies the uniqueness of actual path. However
in order to make BKS and OE compatible one should understand the modal property of
VENUS HOMOTOPICALLY 21
being possible (for paths) in purely epistemic terms - say, as a lack of knowledge about the
actual trajectories. If, on the contrary, one thinks about possible paths in K as physically
real then one violates OE anyway. This latter view is not wholly unreasonable and the
Quantum Mechanics where the truncation K → A does not universally apply, provides
additional reasons for taking it seriously. I stop here and leave an attempt to develop a
HoTT-based theory of identity for Quantum Mechanics for a different occasion.
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